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ABSTRACT 
1. Research question: Codes of governance have proliferated in recent years, yet academic research 
on why boards adopt and implement codes remains limited. This research focuses on the non-profit 
sport sector in the UK and looks at why codes have been adopted by a board of a non-profit sport 
organisation.   
 
2. Research methods: The research draws on a longitudinal case study of board processes in a 
national governing body of sport in the UK, drawing on non-participant observation of board and 
committee meetings, interviews and document analysis.  
 
3. Results and Findings:  We identify that the initial adoption of a code of governance is a way to 
create external legitimacy. Once adopted, a code of governance can strengthen internal legitimacy 
and reinforce board members’ perceptions that the board is well governed. These two processes of 
legitimising are mutually reinforcing, serving to ensure that codes of governance become 
institutionalised at the board level. At the same time, while codes typically emphasise the 
importance of board members making autonomous decisions, in our case board members perceived 
that codes often constrained board autonomy.  
 
4. Implications: This is the first article to provide an ‘insider’, board-level perspective on code 
adoption in the non-profit sport sector. It also enhances debate on the role of legitimacy in code 
adoption, by distinguishing between external legitimising as a formal, impersonal process, and 
internal legitimising, which typically unfolds through discussion, negotiation and reflection. 
 
Key words: Codes; Governance; Codification; Boards; Non-profit sport organisations 
Word count: c. 8,900 
 
3 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In the twenty-first century, codes of governance have become widespread (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Cuomo et al. (2016) show how poor corporate behaviour in 2002 and the 
financial crisis in 2008 precipitated two ‘peak’ periods during which new codes emerged and existing 
codes were updated. This proliferation led Nordberg and McNulty (2013, p. 348) to argue that 
governance codes are now ‘an important worldwide phenomenon, affecting both how businesses 
set policy and how governments weigh the need for regulation’. In the last decade or so, this 
‘codification of governance’ has also spread to the public and non-profit sectors. More specifically – 
and this provides the context for this article – it has spread to the non-profit sport sectors of many 
countries. 
 
Despite the rapid proliferation of codes, academic research on codification is relatively 
scarce. Almost ten years ago, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, p. 385) identified a ‘lag between 
advances in the creation of codes and the studies analysing them’ and while research has advanced 
since then, it is still limited. Early research focused almost exclusively on codification in the for-profit 
sector and on three main issues, namely: the reasons behind the emergence of codes (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 2009; Enione et al., 2006); the content and nature of the codes themselves 
(Dawson & Dunn, 2006) and the relationship between code compliance and firm performance 
(MacNeil & Li, 2006). Cuomo et al. (2016) showed that research has grown since 2008, although the 
focus has remained on firm-level studies and on surveying compliance statements, looking at why 
firms deviate from code recommendations and looking at code compliance and firm performance. 
Therefore, despite the recent growth in academic studies, we still know very little about codification 
in the public and non-profit sectors and very little about how boards, and board members, interpret 
and respond to codes of governance (Seidl, 2007). 
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This article seeks to address this lack of board-level understanding through an in-depth 
analysis of codification in the UK non-profit sport sector, drawing on a longitudinal case study of the 
board of a national governing body of sport (NGB). We aim to provide insight into two fundamental 
and inter-related questions. First, why do boards of non-profit sport organisations adopt codes of 
governance? Second, how do board members perceive codes of governance? These require 
analysing how board members talk about codes, how they discuss codes in board and committee 
meetings and how they negotiate around codes. We explore these questions through a broad 
institutional framework and through a focus on the concept of legitimacy. 
 
There are three main contributions. First, we offer an ‘insider’ board-level perspective on 
codification. As noted, there has been very little focus on processes of code adoption within 
organisations and, more generally, most research on organisational governance has failed to open 
the ‘black box’ of board process (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). Second, we provide a more 
theoretically-informed discussion on code adoption, drawing on the concept of legitimacy. The 
‘insider’ perspective allowed us to explore the legitimising processes at the centre of code adoption 
and we contribute to theoretical debate by: drawing a distinction between external and internal 
legitimising; demonstrating how legitimising processes operate through perception and discussion of 
codes; and showing how board members also perceive codes as constraining board autonomy. 
Third, in light of the increasing importance of governance in the non-profit sport sector, this article 
provides an empirically-grounded study in code adoption and highlights existing research to those 
sport management scholars not currently familiar with research around codification. 
 
CODIFICATION OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Codification of governance is often portrayed straightforwardly – as an immediate and 
necessary response to specific corporate failures. Yet academic analysis (e.g., Seidl, 2007) suggests it 
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is actually a much more complex process, or set of processes, which unfold over time. Nordberg and 
McNulty (2013) explain how codification developed following the long-term shift from proprietorial 
capitalism to institutional investment, which brought with it the requirement for organisations to 
demonstrate good governance in order to satisfy institutional investors. Likewise, Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, p. 380) argue that ‘companies, as well as countries, seek to make their 
corporate governance practices more effective, in part as a consequence of corporate governance 
scandals, but also to attract investors’. This suggests that codification might, in fact, be best 
understood through a broad institutional framework, in which various organisations are seen as 
seeking to position themselves in relation to others. This makes sense, as it can be argued that codes 
of governance are institutional ‘forces’, which constitute various interests, relations and meanings 
(Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). In addition, codes can become taken for granted; they are self-reinforcing, 
in the sense that while they shape behaviour; they inscribe meanings that further shape behaviour; 
and they provide a framework on which to judge organisational behaviour (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). 
 
Some previous research has drawn on institutional ideas to understand code development 
and adoption at a macro level (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Enrione et al., 2006; Okhmatovskiy 
& David, 2012; Seidl, 2007; Seidl et al., 2013; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). In relation to code 
development, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) identified the growth in codes of governance 
across 49 countries and demonstrated that a common-law legal system, a lack of shareholder 
protection rights, high levels of government liberalisation, and a strong presence of foreign 
institutional investors were key factors underpinning their emergence. In subsequent research, they 
identified at least 196 codes of governance across 64 countries by the middle of 2008, suggesting, at 
a basic level, that exogenous, institutional pressures had led to strong demand for codes of 
governance (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Similarly, Enrione et al. (2006) argue that 
‘precipitating jolts’ (e.g., corporate governance failures) in the 1980s led to the emergence of new 
actors, such as institutional investors and market regulators, developing rules and regulations 
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around governance that underpinned a shift in the norms and expectations around organisational 
behaviour.  
 
In relation to code adoption, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) and Nordberg and McNulty 
(2013) explain how codification in the for-profit sector brought with it the requirement for 
organisations to demonstrate good governance. Likewise, Ebrahim (2010, p.11), in his analysis of 
accountability in the non-profit sector, argues that the adoption of codes is a way to ‘send signals of 
good housekeeping to the outside world’. Thus, research to date suggests that organisations 
developing codes of governance are responding to institutional pressures, while those adopting 
codes are also positioning themselves within a particular institutional environment. Within this 
broad institutional framework, we argue that codification can most usefully be understood through 
a specific focus on the concept of legitimacy. 
 
Legitimacy, as defined by Suchman (1995, p. 574), is a ‘generalised perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’. The importance of legitimacy leads organisations 
to adopt particular forms or structures, not necessarily because they are more efficient or 
productive, but because they confer legitimacy within the institutional environment (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Selznick, 1996). In adopting codes, it can be argued that organisations are seeking to 
gain legitimacy. Seidl (2007) argues that this is derived in large part from the narrative that 
underpins the codes, namely that they are considered ‘best practice’. However, he also argues that 
the emergence of codes leads to self-reinforcing behaviour, whereby organisational actors observe 
how others adhere to codes, reinforcing the need for others to adopt the code. In summary, then, 
we can understand the development and organisation-level adoption of codes as a ‘hunt’, or a 
‘battle’, for legitimacy within a broad institutional environment, reflecting the traditional claims that 
legitimacy is a phenomenon external to the organisation (Drori & Honig, 2013). 
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Yet, to date, there has been very little empirical exploration of the adoption and 
implementation of codes within organisations, i.e., how codes are interpreted by key organisational 
decision-makers and how they become embedded (or not) within ongoing organisational practices. 
Enrione et al. (2006, p. 964) recognised this, when they argued that we need to better understand 
how governance enactors, such as large shareholders, senior management and board members, 
understand and interpret codes of governance and how this shapes organisational responses. This, 
in turn, recognises that legitimacy is a cognitive process (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and thus 
requires a focus on the ‘purposeful and the everyday mundane actions through which individual and 
collective actors….attempt to disrupt, maintain, or create institutions’ (Muzio et al., 2013, p. 700). 
 
Recently, Drori and Honig (2013) examined organisational legitimacy through a longitudinal, 
process-oriented study. They argued that the creation of legitimacy is both a process of external and 
internal forms, yet academic research has overlooked the role of internal legitimacy and how it 
emerges within organisations. They define internal legitimacy as ‘the acceptance or normative 
validation of an organizational strategy through the consensus of its participants, which acts as a tool 
that reinforces organizational practices and mobilizes organizational members around a common 
ethical, strategic or ideological vision’ (Drori & Honig, 2013, p. 347). Significantly, they argue that 
only by examining the internal response to external legitimation can we understand ‘the social 
formation of legitimacy as a dynamic process’ (Drori & Honig, 2013, p. 349). 
 
When applied to codification, it is clear that there is a lack of understanding as to the role of 
internal legitimacy. If we argue that codes of governance represent ‘cultural schemas and 
configurations regarding ‘how things are done’’ (Drori & Honig, 2013, p. 349), we need to 
understand the role that both external and internal legitimacy play in maintaining their ongoing 
importance. This requires a focus on how board members, as key organisational decision-makers, 
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perceive codes of governance; how (if at all) codes become embedded and taken for granted within 
the context of the board; and what the implications of these processes are for boards. Teasing out 
these issues, however, is far from straightforward. As a number of authors have noted (e.g., 
Cornforth, 2012; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Roberts et al., 2005), research on organisational 
governance tends to be ‘distant’ from its objects of inquiry, relying on cross-sectional, quantitative 
research designs. 
 
Adopting a process-oriented approach is more likely to enable understanding of board-level 
interaction and decision-making, but this involves the kind of longitudinal, ‘insider’ research designs 
that are often difficult to achieve, due to difficulties in gaining access to boards (Leblanc & Schwartz, 
2007). Moreover, even if it is possible to gain access to boards, this does not mean that board 
members will explicitly discuss whether they adopt codes for legitimacy and/or other purposes. As 
discussed above, codes can nurture a ‘self-activating social process’ (Seidl, 2007, p. 712) that may be 
difficult to observe and interpret. Nevertheless, it is crucial to try to understand codification at the 
board level. If we accept that boards are ‘decision-making groups whose internal processes and 
external context should be better understood’ (Pugliese et al., 2009, p. 301), then it is clear that we 
can only really understand codification if we understand how and why board members interpret and 
use codes of governance in ongoing processes of discussion and decision-making. In this article, we 
seek to do this in the non-profit sport sector in the UK. 
 
CODIFICATION OF THE NON-PROFIT SPORT SECTOR IN THE UK 
 
Over the past 20 years, as part of the ‘modernisation’ of the non-profit sport sector in the 
UK, there has been an increasing focus on the governance of NGBs (e.g., Grix, 2009: Houlihan & 
Green, 2009; Tacon & Walters, 2016). This has involved a number of policy prescriptions, including 
the development of governance monitoring systems and – the focus here – several codes of 
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governance. During the period in which this research took place, three codes of governance were 
developed (see Table 1). The first was developed in 2004 by UK Sport, the non-departmental public 
body, which oversees elite sport development in the UK, in collaboration with the Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators. The second was developed in 2011 by the Sport and 
Recreation Alliance (SRA), the umbrella body that represents the interests of NGBs in the UK, in 
consultation with a range of sport organisations. (A second edition was published in 2014.) The third 
was issued in 2012 by Sport England, the non-departmental public body, which oversees 
community-level sport in England, setting out six key governance criteria for NGBs to meet in order 
to be eligible for funding. While the UK Sport document was labelled a ‘guide’ and Sport England’s a 
‘governance strategy’, the expectation that NGBs meet certain governance standards means that 
they were de facto codes of governance. These codes represent tangible elements of modernisation 
within the non-profit sport sector and reflect an attempt by central government (through the 
national sport agencies) to modernise the governance of NGBs, with a focus on their boards. They 
also display characteristics typical of governance codes: they are grounded in ‘best practice’ and 
were developed by committees of individuals that claim expertise in this area (Seidl, 2007). 
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Table 1: Codes of governance in the non-profit sport sector in the UK 
 
Code Issuer Year Description Main principles/criteria addressed 
Good governance: a 
guide for national 
governing bodies of 
sport 
UK Sport 2004 Developed in collaboration with the 
Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators, as part of the broader 
UK Sport ‘Modernisation programme’. 
- The governing board 
- The individual board member 
- Supporting the board 
- Stakeholder engagement 
Compliance 
Voluntary code of 
good governance for 
the sport and 
recreation sector  
 
Sport and 
Recreation 
Alliance 
 
2011; 
2014 (2nd 
edition) 
 
Developed by the Sport and Recreation 
Alliance, following consultation with a 
range of organisations, including Sport 
England, UK Sport, the British Olympic 
Association, The British Paralympic 
Association, SkillsActive and Birkbeck, 
University of London. 
 
- Integrity: acting as guardians of the sport, 
recreation, activity or area 
- Defining and evaluating the role of the board 
- Delivery of vision, mission and purpose 
- Objectivity: balanced, inclusive and skilled 
board 
- Standards, systems and controls 
- Accountability and transparency 
- Understanding and engaging with the sporting 
landscape 
Sport England 
governance strategy: 
on board for better 
governance 
 
Sport 
England 
2012 A document that set out six key 
governance criteria that National 
Governing Bodies of Sport have to 
meet in order to be eligible for Sport 
England funding. 
- A skilled and diverse board 
- Appropriate board remit, ideally up to 12 
members, strategic focus 
- Decision making at the right level 
- Well led board, at least 25% independents, 
usually 2 x 4 year terms 
- Legal structure allows open recruitment to 
board 
- Transparent and accountable 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This research is based on an in-depth, qualitative case study of the board of a non-profit 
sport organisation – a national governing body of sport (NGB) in the UK. We follow a number of 
authors (e.g., Cornforth, 2012; Pettigrew, 1997; Roberts et al., 2005) in seeing governance as a set of 
ongoing processes and thus we argue that to understand it, we need to better understand the 
context and dynamics of organisational life. We were initially interested in how and why NGB board 
members individually and collectively made decisions within the wider context of the modernisation 
of the non-profit sport sector. In studying this, it became clear that codification of governance could 
be seen as a specific ‘tool’ of modernisation and that it affected the board and the wider 
organisation in important ways.  
 
Case study background 
The case study organisation is an NGB that is constituted as a company limited by guarantee 
and acts as the development agency for two sports within the UK. The organisation receives the 
majority of its funding through Sport England, the non-departmental public body that distributes 
funding from central government and the National Lottery to support community-level sport in 
England. The organisation was governed by a board of 12 members: an independent chair, six 
‘federation’ directors (three representatives from each of the two national federations of the sports 
it represents), and five independent directors. In addition, the two chief executives attended the 
board, as non-voting, but very significant, participants. The board also had four committees: the 
Development and Strategy Committee; the Governance Committee; the Finance Committee; and the 
Commercial Committee. 
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Gaining access to the board and its committees was the crucial step that enabled us to carry 
out the research. Here, one of the chief executives was the initial ‘gatekeeper’. She recognised the 
growing importance of governance within the sector and was keen for some independent analysis of 
the way the board functioned. As such, she (and the rest of the board) invited us to attend meetings, 
conduct interviews and analyse documents and we, in turn, produced two independent reports for 
the board. Our approach could be considered ethnographic, in the broadest sense, in that we sought 
an ‘insider’ perspective on how the board functioned. However, unlike traditional ethnography, we 
did not seek to offer an holistic account of a culture-sharing group (Madden, 2010). 
 
Data collection  
 We began the research in November 2011 and continued through to July 2016, with three 
main waves of data collection (see Figure 1). We collected data through direct observation of board 
and committee meetings, semi-structured interviews and analysis of key organisational documents 
(see Table 2). Observation and interviews allowed us to gain insight into the processes of interaction, 
discussion and decision-making that characterise the ongoing ‘work’ of organisations (Langley et al., 
2013) and it allowed us to begin our study with a broad focus. Early in the data collection, as noted 
above, codification emerged as an important issue. The SRA code was launched in late 2011 and we 
observed how this was discussed at board and committee meetings. During the interviews and in 
subsequent observations, we sought to examine further how board members interpreted and ‘used’ 
codes in ongoing processes of discussion and decision-making. 
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Figure 1: The research period 
  
  
2000 
Founded 
2004 
First Whole 
Sport Plan 
funding bid 
submitted to 
Sport England 
2008 
Second Whole 
Sport Plan 
funding bid 
submitted to 
Sport England 
2012 
Third Whole 
Sport Plan 
funding bid 
submitted to 
Sport England 
2007 
Becomes 
limited 
company 
2005-2009 
First Whole Sport Plan funding period 
November 2011 –  
December 2012 
First research 
period, comprising 
observations of 
board and 
committee 
meetings and 
seven interviews 
March 2014 –  
June 2014 
Second research 
period, 
comprising four 
interviews 
 
2009-2013 
Second Whole Sport Plan funding period 
2013-2017 
Third Whole Sport Plan funding period 
May 2016 –  
July 2016  
Third research 
period, comprising 
observations of 
board and 
committee meetings 
and eleven 
interviews 
2016 
Fourth Whole 
Sport Plan 
funding bid 
submitted to 
Sport England 
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Table 2: Data sources 
 
Observations 
(15 full meetings) 
Interviews 
(22 interviews) 
Documents 
(109 key documents) 
2 Annual General 
Meetings 
7 Board Meetings 
4 Governance 
Committee Meetings 
1 Finance Committee 
Meeting 
1 Development and 
Strategy Committee 
Meeting 
Joint CEO (separate) (twice) (A) 
Joint CEO (separate) (twice) (B) 
Joint CEOs (together) 
Chair (twice) (C) 
7 Independent directors (D-J)  
5 Federation directors (one 
interviewed twice) (K-O) 
Committee member (P) 
Senior staff member (Q) 
 
25 sets of board minutes (November 
2011-February 2016) 
73 Sets of committee minutes 
(November 2011-April 2016)  
7 Annual accounts (2008-2014) 
2 ‘Whole Sport Plans’ (2009-13 and 
2013-17) 
2 ‘Balanced Scorecards’ 
 
Data analysis 
We recorded and transcribed all interviews and we wrote up fieldnotes from all 
observations and interviews. We then imported this material into NVivo, along with a range of 
organisational documents (see Table 2). We coded the data using the ‘constant comparative 
method’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and followed the step-by-step analysis process outlined by Gioia 
et al. (2013). The first step involved us closely analysing the interview transcripts and fieldnotes, in 
order to understand how our research participants talked about the various issues relating to 
codification. Both authors coded the first two interview transcripts and sets of fieldnotes together 
and then coded the rest independently. We then met to discuss our findings and together produced 
a set of ‘first-order concepts’, expressed in the participants’ voices. We then grouped these together 
into ‘second-order themes’ (Gioia et al., 2013). This involved a series of discussions and multiple re-
readings of the raw data. Finally, we identified from these second-order themes a smaller number of 
‘aggregate dimensions’, which served as the basis for our understanding of codification. Figure 2 sets 
out the data structure that emerged from our analysis. 
 
  
15 
 
Figure 2: Data structure 
 ‘Something we can use to navigate ourselves.’ 
 ‘We…get the principle out, look at the guidance.’ 
 
 
 ‘It…superficially scrutinises what the governing 
body does, because it doesn’t understand the 
governing body.’ 
 ‘SE are interested in well-governed sport, but 
have one recipe.’ 
 ‘I’m not sure we can flex our muscle against SE’s 
muscle.’ 
 
 ‘We are doing what we are supposed to be 
doing.’ 
 Code(s) reinforcing board processes. 
 Positive feedback from Sport England. 
Best practice  
Accountability tensions  
External legitimising 
Recognising institutional 
pressure 
Developing an internal 
narrative 
Internal legitimising 
Constraining board 
autonomy  
 
 ‘We’ve signed up and not done anything.’ 
 ‘We tick the boxes.’ 
 
 
Symbolic gesturing 
Normalising the code(s) 
 ‘Making it present in the minds of the board 
members.’ 
 Embedding the code(s) into board culture. 
  
 
 
 Governance acknowledged as ‘the hot topic’.  
 Code implementation driven by funding 
demands. 
 ‘Sport England only needs one excuse to cut 
funding to an organisation that's not delivering.’  
First order concepts Second order themes Aggregate dimensions 
 ‘I sometimes wonder whether we’re over 
governing ourselves, because we’re such a small 
organisation.’ 
 The focus on governance takes away from the 
strategic role of the board 
Conformance and 
performance challenges 
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ANALYSIS  
 
External legitimising 
The first finding from this research is that board members adopt codes of governance in part 
to create external legitimacy, something found in previous research (Seidl, 2007; Seidl et al., 2013). 
All board members in our case study organisation recognised the external institutional pressure to 
appear to be well governed.  For example, during a Governance Committee meeting in April 2012, 
one of the independent directors (D) noted that, for Sport England, governance was ‘the hot topic’. 
At the same meeting, one of the members of the committee from outside the organisation stated 
that ‘Governance is flavour of the month’. This recognition of the growing importance of board-level 
governance was reinforced by the emergence of the SRA’s (2011) Voluntary Code and Sport 
England’s (2012) Governance Strategy; together, these codes created an institutional environment in 
which external endorsement was recognised by board members as something that the board 
needed to work towards. This was a key reason the board members collectively decided to sign up 
to the Voluntary Code in late 2011 and to closely monitor, and subsequently seek to adhere to, Sport 
England’s Governance Strategy in 2012. 
 
That this adoption was at least partly ‘legitimating’ was clear both from discussion within 
meetings and from individual interviews. For example, at the November 2012 board meeting, a year 
after signing up to the Voluntary Code, the chair stated openly, ‘We’ve signed up and not done 
anything’.  Moreover, one of the federation representatives, in his interview, stated: ‘We tick off the 
individual items, we did what we’re supposed to do, we tick the boxes…Some people just sort of 
zone out during those periods.’ (Federation Director K). Meanwhile, the Whole Sport Plan – the bid 
document submitted to Sport England in 2012 that formed the basis for organisational funding 
between 2013 and 2017 – told a slightly different story. Here, it was stated that: ‘In 2011 [the 
organisation] signed up to the Sport and Recreation Alliance Voluntary Code of Good Governance. 
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[The organisation] has consistently focused attention on improving its governance, and the seven 
guiding principles provide a clear framework for this work going forward,’ 
 
 It is likely that this institutional pressure to be well governed – or, at least, to be seen to be 
taking steps to improve governance – was felt even more keenly by the board members in our case. 
As Guo (2007) argues, boards of non-profit organisations can be seen as a mechanism to legitimise 
government funding. Where an organisation is highly dependent on government funding, there is a 
critical need to demonstrate adherence to good governance to establish and maintain external 
legitimacy. Our NGB was highly dependent on funding from Sport England and this was reflected in 
discussions observed during board meetings around the relationship between the case study 
organisation and Sport England. One of the Federation Directors (N) stated in the February 2012 
board meeting, ‘It helps if you speak the same language as the primary funder’. This was further 
supported in an interview with the same Federation Director (N) when he stated that ‘Sport England 
only needs one excuse to cut funding to an organisation that's not delivering.’ As one of the 
independent directors (E) revealed in an interview: 
 
Your Sport England guy is going to say, “Well, do you have a policy for this? Do you have a procedure 
for this? Does your board think that it works effectively?” Sorry. If I’m going to fill in a board 
evaluation that I know is going to Sport England, I’m not going to sit there and go, “I know our board 
is terrible, we can’t decide anything.”  So it becomes very easy for lip service to be paid and hoops to 
be jumped through without actually really changing anything.   
 
These quotes demonstrate how board members felt the need to demonstrate accountability 
to Sport England due to the funding relationship. As such, it suggests that the initial decision to sign 
up to the Voluntary Code of governance was in part underpinned by a symbolic, external, 
legitimising dimension, thus aligning with the traditional claims that legitimacy is a phenomenon 
external to the organisation (e.g., Scott, 2001). 
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However, over time, we started to observe board members engaging with governance codes 
that suggested a move beyond symbolic, legitimising behaviour.  The release of the Sport England 
code in 2012 was an important moment for the NGB. Given that they received the majority of their 
funding from Sport England, we noted that towards the end of 2012 the implementation of code 
requirements became more embedded within board practice. For example the use of the codes was 
made concrete within the November 2012 board meeting, with the chair framing the discussion of 
the Voluntary Code by arguing that it was ‘something that we can use to navigate ourselves’. In an 
exercise led by one of the chief executives, each board member had to consider and then state 
which of the seven principles of the SRA’s Voluntary Code was most important in general, and which 
the board ought to focus on next. Then, the board discussed collectively how they would move 
towards enacting that principle and several actions were agreed upon and followed up in 
subsequent board meetings. One of the independent directors explained in her interview how this 
had become a semi-regular board practice: 
 
We take probably one principle now per board meeting, or every other board meeting and we look at 
it and we discuss it in the wider context of, do we do this, how do we do this, how do we evidence it? 
Because you have to have that conversation. And how does this inform our strategic thinking going 
forward? (Independent Director E) 
 
Although we observed that the salience of this governance work around the Voluntary Code 
fluctuated in subsequent meetings, it was clear that from the end of 2012 onwards, the board’s 
approach towards the codes was not exclusively symbolic and that there was a concerted effort to 
demonstrate that they were applying principles of good governance. While we recognise that 
external legitimacy was in part responsible for the deeper embedding of governance codes in board 
discussions, it was clear that processes of internal legitimising were operating too. 
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Internal legitimising 
Internal legitimising refers to the way that board members seek to establish legitimacy 
within their own organisational environment (Drori & Honig, 2013). Underpinning this in our case 
was the notion of codes as ‘best practice’ (Seidl, 2007). As one of the independent directors (D) 
stated in the Governance Committee meeting in April 2012, ‘The [Voluntary Code] actually 
encourages the federations and ourselves to look at ourselves – sort of a self-assurance process’. 
This was perhaps even more salient when introducing governance to a board in which relatively little 
prior knowledge existed. For example, one of the independent directors (F) stated in their interview 
‘I am not a governance expert. I am not on the board for my governance and governance is not 
something that particularly excites me being brutally honest’. This suggests that there is perhaps a 
stronger propensity to accept the adoption and the principles contained within a code where there 
is little understanding of the governance function.  
 
We observed that the acceptance and normalisation of codes through the application of 
code principles to the board also involved the development of an internal organisational narrative 
that the board was well governed. This narrative, part of the internal legitimising process, was both 
deliberate and explicit. For example, the implementation of a variety of mechanisms including: an 
annual skills audit of board members; the recruitment of directors based on skills; open recruitment 
procedures; and identifying the training needs of board members all came directly from the 
principles contained within the Voluntary Code and, subsequently, ‘On Board for Better Governance’ 
from Sport England. The implementation of these measures served to strengthen the narrative that 
the board was well governed and thus normalise the code, with board members accepting that this 
was the best way to ensure the board was well governed. 
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This was exemplified at the Governance Committee meeting in April 2012, where there was 
discussion on how Sport England was seeking to use funding to drive governance changes in sport 
organisations. The main two recommendations were around having a skills-based board and 
ensuring an open recruitment process. One of the members of this committee stated that from a 
skills perspective, the board was ‘ok on independents – you’re great. On representative members, 
you’re not ok.’ This was followed up by the development of a skills audit for the board. In the 
November 2012 board meeting, we observed how the board sought to implement Principle 4 of the 
SRA’s code – ‘Objectivity: Balanced, Inclusive and Skilled Board’. During this meeting, there was 
lengthy discussion about the composition of the board and the balance between a ‘representative’ 
and a ‘skills-based’ board. This discussion was based on the ‘best practice’ recommendations 
contained within the SRA code, demonstrating that the code had some influence on board-level 
discussions around a skills-based board. On one level, this was clearly to demonstrate the need for 
external legitimacy. However, at the same time it led to internal legitimacy and reinforced the view 
that the board was well governed. As one of the independent directors (D) stated in the November 
2012 board meeting, ‘We have a skills matrix, which is a strength’.  
 
Individual interviews also demonstrated this internal legitimising. As one of the federation 
directors (L) stated in an interview when asked about the governance of the board: ‘Gradually, [the 
chair] brought a different perspective to it. It’s much more governed, more organised, more precise, 
more strategic. It does what it says on the tin effectively’. Likewise, board members drew on 
documents, such as the Whole Sport Plan and an Action Plan to deliver on Sport England governance 
requirements, to bolster this sense of internal legitimacy. 
 
This internal legitimising process was also strengthened by external stakeholder feedback. 
For example, it was noted in various board meetings that the CEOs reported strong and positive 
feedback from Sport England in regard to the self-assurance process and the on-site audits, of which 
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governance was a key issue. This was elaborated on in an interview with the chair (C) when 
discussing the governance of the board: 
 
….what I heard from [the chief executives] is that Sport England are appreciative of what we’ve done. 
We’ve done what we said we would do. We are seen as one of the better sports that is actually 
achieving its objectives…We’re in a position of we’ve done well with what we’re doing. We’ve got a 
good trajectory and movement. We just want to continue. 
 
The reporting of this feedback to the board helped to create and strengthen the 
organisational narrative that the board was well governed and thus reinforce internal board 
legitimacy. In this sense, the internal legitimising process was subtle. Our analysis suggested that it 
was seemingly unconscious, in that it involved normalisation through language and ‘framing’. As 
Nordberg and McNulty (2013, p. 353) argue, ‘Codes provide the texts of corporate governance, and 
their language frames the perception of the work of boards’. This was evident in our case study, as, 
over time, the language of the codes – itself the language of modernisation and professionalisation 
(Houlihan & Green, 2009) – became normalised within board discussions. Board members 
increasingly discussed the need to be ‘business-like’ and ‘professional’. ‘We’re not a business, but 
we need to be business-like,’ said one of the independent directors (D) in the wider discussion of the 
Voluntary Code in the November 2012 board meeting. Moreover, there were many examples in our 
observations and in the interviews where ‘business-speak’ was common. For example, board 
members would often express the need to remain focused on ‘high-level strategy’ and ensure that 
the operational details were left to the executive. One of the independent directors (D) stated in an 
interview when discussing the role of the board: ‘it’s giving the structure to the operational delivery; 
it’s not doing the operational delivery’. This classic agency perspective is explicit in the various sport 
codes (and governance codes more broadly), demonstrating how this position can become 
embedded within board members’ mind-sets and how codes of governance can help to frame and 
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reinforce the work of boards (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013), thus contributing to the internal 
legitimising process.  
 
Constraining board autonomy 
The interplay between external and internal legitimising processes provides an 
understanding of why codes have been adopted by non-profit sport organisations. However, beyond 
these legitimising processes, we also sought to understand more broadly how board members 
perceived codes of governance. This involved analysing how they discussed codes in board and 
committee meetings and how they negotiated around codes. An additional issue that emerged was 
that code adoption created tensions and was seen, by some, as a ‘constraining force’. Previous 
research has noted that by obtaining legitimacy, non-profit organisations are given discretionary 
control over the provision of services (Euske & Euske, 1991). However, in the context of sport, Sam 
(2009, pp. 500-501) argues that while non-profit sport organisations have been encouraged to adopt 
managerial practices in order to gain autonomy and empowerment, increasing audit and 
performance measurement has frequently undermined this claim, resulting in constraints on their 
ability to balance multiple stakeholder demands.  
 
This latter argument was particularly apt in the context of our case study. During the 
observation period, there were two examples where the guidelines contained within codes and the 
need for external legitimacy, were perceived by board members as constraining autonomy. The first 
concerned board composition and specifically the decision over whether to make the CEOs full 
board members. This was discussed in the January 2012 Governance Committee and subsequently 
put to a vote at the February 2012 board meeting, where the board formally agreed to appoint them 
(thus increasing the board from 12 to 14 members). However, this never actually happened and the 
articles of association were never changed to reflect this decision. This was because, around the 
same time, Sport England published their code, which stated that ‘Ideally the Board size should not 
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exceed 12 members. In exceptional circumstances where the Board size exceeds this number, the 
NGB must be able to justify this on the basis of organisational effectiveness’ (Sport England, 2012, p. 
9). This led to a series of discussions at board level about whether the appointment of both CEOs 
would count as ‘exceptional circumstances’, or whether it might be possible to restructure the board 
to keep it at 12 members. 
 
What was clear in these discussions was that the federations did not want to lose any of 
their representative directors, nor was there appetite to reduce the number of independent 
directors (in part due to the emphasis placed on independent directors in both the SRA’s Voluntary 
Code and the Sport England code). Ultimately, the decision to formally add the CEOs to the board 
simply lost momentum, due to concerns about whether it would hamper the organisation’s chances 
of gaining funding. In effect, the provisions of the Sport England code meant that the board felt it 
was unable to accept the two CEOs onto the board, despite having taken the decision to do so, on 
the basis that it would improve governance and, ultimately, organisational effectiveness. While this, 
first and foremost, demonstrates the high level of dependence the organisation had on Sport 
England funding, it also shows how the provisions of governance codes can constrain board 
autonomy. In this case, it was the fact that the code provisions were so specific (despite the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ clause) that meant that board members felt constrained. 
 
While the discussions around board size centred on the explicit provisions of the Sport 
England code, this second example around strategy demonstrates how codes can constrain 
autonomy more implicitly. Both the Voluntary Code and Sport England’s code emphasise that boards 
should set the strategy of the organisation and we observed a number of board meetings, in which 
board members appeared to be doing exactly this. For example, in the May 2012 board meeting, 
there was discussion around moving from a ‘defensive to offensive’ position in relation to Sport 
England, with the chair stating ‘This is what we want to do, if SE want to come on board’. In 
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November 2012, the chair reiterated that the board needed to think about ‘What we want to 
achieve for our sports’ and then get ‘SE on board with what we want to achieve’.  
 
In practice, however, our case study organisation’s high level of dependence on funding 
meant that the board felt it needed to align its Whole Sport Plan very closely to the policy objectives 
of Sport England. For example, the four-year strategy for the previous Whole Sport Plan (2009-2013) 
was aligned closely to Sport England’s emphasis on raising participation amongst particular age 
groups. This ‘need for alignment’ in relation to the following Whole Sport Plan (2013-2017) was also 
evident: more so in the interviews where individuals were more open about the fact that the 
strategy was driven (constrained) by the high level of dependency on Sport England. As one 
independent director (F) stated, ‘inevitably when you're funded by one majority funder, you're very 
acquiescent to their needs’. The chair (C) stated in an interview that ‘…it’s almost as if we are an 
agency of Sport England’, whilst one of the chief executives (A) said during her interview, 
 
I mean, there’s that sort of dichotomy of, you know, the message from Sport England is that you 
should first think about what would be good for your sport. And then, you know, they should see 
what parts of that strategy they would fund. But we don’t…in truth, we can’t operate like that. We 
first think about what they’re willing to fund. 
 
This demonstrated the fact that board members were aware of how they were constrained 
by their funding relationship with, and accountability towards, Sport England. It suggests that codes 
also have a subtle and pervasive influence in that they help to further reinforce and embed the top-
down hierarchical nature of the funding relationship. Our board-level analysis demonstrated a clear 
tension between the language of autonomy within the codes of governance and the organisational 
‘reality’ of feeling the need to demonstrate external legitimacy through the adoption of principles 
contained within a code, which, in turn, constrained board decision-making. As the chair said at the 
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May 2012 board meeting, ‘I’m not sure we can flex our muscle against SE’s muscle, saying we’re well 
governed’. The concern was that by adhering to code requirements, there was little room to take 
strategic decisions more specific to the idiosyncratic nature of the organisation. This was pointed out 
by one of the chief executives (B) in an interview, when he stated that ‘there’s a possibility that it 
[the code] then superficially scrutinises what the governing body does, because it doesn’t 
understand the governing body’. Related to this was the concern, expressed by independent director 
(E), that the codification of governance is problematic in that it distracts or even undermines the 
ability to embed a strong governance culture in the organisation and removes some level of 
organisational autonomy: 
 
But I think that’s also followed from the fact that sports governing bodies and sports funders bodies 
also misunderstood governance when it first became a hot topic. And it was all about process and 
documents, and rating everything within an inch of its life, when actually what we’re trying to, or 
what they should be trying to create are organisations that have the right values, but are allowed to 
be experts in their own field and organise themselves in a way that works for them.        
 
There was also further concern that codification meant that the organisation was spending 
too much time focused on governance issues. While codification enabled some forms of internal 
legitimacy, some board members felt that it led to ‘over-governance’; a sense that too much time 
was spent by the board on issues of governance rather than actually getting on and making what 
they felt were the key decisions that the board needed to make. This perspective was evident in an 
interview with one of the  federation directors:  
 
We do spend a lot of time, I think, on governance type of issues…I sometimes wonder whether we’re 
over-governing ourselves, because we’re such a small organisation to set very high standards for 
activities. It’s not to say you shouldn’t have high standards, but sometimes you feel that you're 
digging up the rose bushes to look at the rose. It’s a little bit too often. (Federation Director K) 
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This supports one of the fundamental governance paradoxes noted by Cornforth (2004), 
namely that boards must simultaneously attend to ‘conformance’ and ‘performance’. The need to 
conform to codes of governance takes up board time that some see as better spent on other 
activities, such as strategic planning. Ultimately, getting the balance between the conformance and 
performance role is a key challenge faced by boards (in both the for-profit and non-profit sectors) 
and one that is difficult to achieve. It is therefore legitimate to question whether the imposition of 
codes of governance somehow distorts this balance. As Dawson and Dunn (2006, p. 36) argue, codes 
‘can have a distorting effect on the culture of organisations and the practice of governance, leading 
to behaviour based upon an organisations’ concern with stakeholder perception rather than 
behaviour more specifically directed to the organisations’ mission’. This issue is particularly acute 
when dealing with organisations (such as our case study) that are highly dependent on public 
funding, leading board members to feel a sense of constraint brought about by the institutional 
environment.    
 
DISCUSSION 
 
While the development of codes of governance is now a widespread phenomenon, and 
academic analysis on the codification of governance is a growing area of interest (Cuomo et al., 
2016), there is still relatively little understanding of board-level responses to this process. In part, 
this is due to the methodological challenges associated with conducting ‘insider’ board research that 
have long been recognised (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). However, if we understand the board as a 
key ‘decision-making group’ (Pugliese et al., 2009, p. 301) and a ‘governance enactor’ (Enrione et al., 
2006, p. 964), then we need to understand the perceptions of board members on specific issues 
such as adopting and implementing codes of governance. This article has attempted to address this 
methodological limitation through an in-depth, qualitative case study of a board of a non-profit 
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sport organisation as a way to understand why board members adopt codes of governance and how 
they perceive codes of governance.  
  
We have shown that the initial adoption of a code of governance is a way to create external 
legitimacy. In our particular case, this was even more salient given that the organisation was highly 
dependent on public funding. Adopting a code of governance is therefore, in part, an external 
legitimising process through which a non-profit sport organisation is able to demonstrate adherence 
to the behavioural norms associated with the private-sector culture that underpin code 
development. Our board-level analysis thus corroborates previous research that has argued that 
codes are adopted in order to confer legitimacy within an institutional environment (Seidl, 2007: 
Seidl et al., 2013). In this sense, external legitimising – officially adopting a code and seeking to 
communicate that adoption – is primarily a formal, depersonalised process. 
  
However, we also found that board members engaged in internal legitimising. In contrast to 
the largely depersonalised processes involved in external legitimising, internal legitimising involved 
board members discussing codes of governance face-to-face, evaluating their usefulness, using them 
to advance their opinions, reflecting on them and negotiating around them. For example, board 
members drew on the principles contained within the Voluntary Code and the Sport England code to 
validate their beliefs that the board was well governed, thus building internal legitimacy. Our in-
depth, process-oriented research approach was arguably necessary to examine these processes and 
might explain why previous research on codification has overlooked the role of internal legitimacy in 
the institutionalisation of governance codes. As such, our findings are the first to show how codes of 
governance are normalised and reinforced not only through the development of an externally 
legitimising narrative, but also through an internal legitimising narrative that reinforces board 
member perceptions that the board is well governed.  
 
28 
 
Previous research has argued the need to better understand how internal and external 
legitimacy relate to one another and shape organisational actions (Drori & Honig, 2013). In our case, 
external legitimising came first. The board took the decision to sign up to the Voluntary Code with 
relatively little discussion and only later did board members really begin to reflect on the principles 
of the code. Overall, though, we argue that that the processes of external and internal legitimising 
were mutually reinforcing: board members primarily adopted the codes to demonstrate external 
legitimacy, but then collectively ‘reflected inwards’ on this process, accepting and normalising the 
codes. The subsequent strengthening of internal board legitimacy reinforced the governance focus 
of the board and this in turn served to maintain their external legitimacy. This mutually reinforcing 
cycle suggests that organisational legitimacy is reproduced and reinforced by the internal actions of 
the board alongside their external legitimation processes. 
 
We suggest, then, that external and internal legitimising processes act together to reinforce 
the overall legitimacy of codes of governance. They help to ensure that codes over time develop into 
an institutional force by becoming taken for granted, shaping behaviour, and inscribing meanings 
within boards. As a result, codes of governance can be seen as a mechanism or tool of the broader 
modernisation agenda that seeks to influence the way that NGBs are structured and operate. In the 
first instance, this leads to lines of accountability drawn upwards towards public funders, such as 
Sport England, as discussed in previous research (Houlihan & Green, 2009; Sam, 2009; Tacon & 
Walters, 2016). It then also, more subtly, leads to a gradual shift in institutional logics (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005), in which the principles and norms enshrined in codes become taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the governance of the organisation and demonstrates the pervasive influence 
that codes can have on board member beliefs and how they become embedded within board 
practice. Both external and internal legitimising processes demonstrate that boards are engaged in 
an ongoing struggle for legitimacy. Our research suggests organisations can reach ‘temporary’ 
settlements – i.e., when an organisation is seen as legitimate within its environment (in our case, 
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funded by Sport England) and when board members are confident that they meet the principles of 
good governance. However, this struggle for legitimacy is dynamic and ongoing. 
 
Moreover, it is intertwined with another struggle – for autonomy – and codes of governance 
can exacerbate this. Our research has shown how some board members, in certain situations, 
perceive codes as inhibiting board autonomy. This shows how codes of governance can shape board 
behaviour in multiple, sometimes conflicting, ways. As discussed above, they were used as a source 
of information and guidance by board members. However, they can also constrain decision-making 
and impose particular structures and ways of thinking. This was explicitly linked to the fact that 
when a code is issued by a funding agency and an organisation is highly dependent on such funding, 
the code can reduce the autonomy of boards, drawing lines of accountability upwards and creating a 
form of principal-agent relationship between the funder and the organisation. This was seen in the 
context of board size, where board members drew explicitly on the code for guidance. More subtle 
and pervasive processes of influence were seen in the context of board strategy. These findings 
provide empirical support for Nordberg and McNulty’s (2013, p. 349) argument that, ‘upon 
acceptance, codes of governance become institutionalised, placing constraints on action and 
providing legitimacy for corporations and directors who adhere to them’. It therefore contradicts the 
emphasis that most codes place on boards acting autonomously and demonstrates that board 
members operate in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, they are seen as ‘governance 
enactors’ (Enrione et al., 2006, p. 964), yet, on the other, the adoption of a code of governance takes 
away a certain level of authority from board members and the role of the board.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This is one of the first articles to undertake board-level research on the codification of 
governance and, to our knowledge, the first to do so in sport. Using a broad institutional framework, 
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with a specific focus on legitimacy, and drawing on a longitudinal case study of a single non-profit 
sport organisation, we have shown that the adoption of codes of governance can be understood as a 
legitimising process in two specific ways. First, it acts to create external (stakeholder) legitimacy. 
Signing up to a code was shown as a way to create external legitimacy – here, to demonstrate to 
Sport England that the organisation was committed to taking the issue of governance seriously. 
Second, once adopted, a code of governance was found to strengthen internal legitimacy, 
reinforcing board members’ perceptions that the board was well governed. We argue these two 
forms of organisational legitimacy are mutually reinforcing, serving to ensure that codes of 
governance become institutionalised at the board level. We also show how a code of governance 
can be perceived as constraining board autonomy, strengthening lines of accountability upwards 
through explicit adherence to code principles and, more subtly, through shifting institutional logics 
within the board. 
 
Given that codes of governance are becoming increasingly common in the non-profit sector 
in the UK and elsewhere, these findings are of relevance where pressures to modernise have led to 
publicly-funded organisations having to demonstrate upwards accountability (Alexander et al., 2010; 
Ebrahim, 2010; Guo, 2007). They are of particular relevance to the non-profit sport sector in the UK 
and more widely where the pressures to adhere to governance codes are evident (e.g., Australian 
Sports Commission, 2005; Sport and Recreation New Zealand, 2006). Moreover, codification itself, as 
a broad process, continues to evolve. In December 2016, Sport England and UK Sport released the 
Code for Sports Governance (Sport England/UK Sport, 2016), a joint code, which is mandatory for 
any NGB seeking funding. This extends beyond the scope of our research, but it raises further 
interesting questions that demand attention. For example, will the fact that the code is mandatory 
actually undermine efforts to embed a culture of good governance, as NGBs revert towards seeing 
governance as a box-ticking exercise? What does this mean for external and internal legitimising? 
Ultimately, it shows that, as codification evolves, so too must our analysis. 
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